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The opening words of Bacon's essay Of Truth are: "What is truth?
said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."
The validity of any statement about international law turns on the
meaning one is prepared to give the term. To say that the obligation to
pay prompt, adequate and effective compensation for the expropriation
of alien property derives from the body of traditional customary international law pertaining to the responsibility of states, or that the obligation derives from domestic (constitutional), and not international law
at all, is to speak without clear referent. Clarity of both intent and
ideology are absolute necessities.
I.

THE TRADITIONAL CUSTOMARY DOCTRINE

In the Factory at Chorzow' case the Permanent Court of International Justice, the inter-war predecessor of the present International
Court of Justice, concluded that international law required states which
expropriated property to pay compensation, not only for the assets
taken, but also for the owner's loss of profits-but not, presumably, for
speculative profits, sed quaere. 2 In that case the Court laid down in
detail the principles of compensation. It called for:
Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum
corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the
award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be
covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it . . . . 3

The Court's thesis in the above case was reinforced, in a number of
ways, by its decisions in both the Paneuezys-Saldutiskis Railway 4 and
the Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Merits) 5 cases.
*Professor of Law, Director, International Legal Studies Program, College of Law,
Syracuse University.
1. [19281 P.C.l.J., ser. A, No. 13.
2. On the point of the Permanent Court of International Justice's measure of damages holding in the Factory at Chorzow decision and speculative damages, see H. LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 315-16
(1958).
3. [19281 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 13, at 47.
4. [19391 P.C.l.J., ser. A/B, No. 76.
5. [19261 P.C.l.J., ser. A, No. 7.
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PROBLEMS OF RELEVANCE-CONTEMPORARY CONFRONTATIONS AND CONTRADICTIONS

All these cases, however, were decided in the period between World
War I and World War II. Many contemporary commentators argue that
we cannot accept the authority of decisions from that period since it
belongs to an age that is culturally and politically antediluvian. But
does disagreement with the past necessarily abolish its contemporary
relevance? The relevance and meaning of many inter-war concepts of
international law are in a state of flux. But such a factual observation,
while reporting negatively, perhaps, on rights which may have been cast
into that observed flux, cannot, of itself, validate new rights, in particular validate or justify the expropriation of alien property without imposing any corresponding or complementary duty to pay prompt, adequate
and effective compensation to the owner of the confiscated investments.
Even after we have said, with Justice Harlan in Banco Nacional de
Cuba u. Sabbatino, 6 that:
There are few if any issues in international law today on which
opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a state's power to
expropriate the property of aliens. There is, of course, authority, in
international judicial and arbitral decisions, in the expressions of national governments, and among commentators for the view that a taking is improper under international law if it is not for a public purpose,
is discriminatory, or is without provision for prompt, adequate, and
effective compensation . . . .
The disagreement as to relevant international law standards reflects an even more basic divergence between the national interests of
capital importing and capital exporting nations and between the social
ideologies of those countries that favor state control of a considerable
portion of the means of production and those that adhere to a free
enterprise system. 7

We can still disagree with his conclusion. The jump from alleging
or reporting the fact of the dissolution of old rights to asserting new and
contrary rights is not justified of itself. For the new rights to be established, their new underpinnings must be demonstrated. Merely to report
the dissolution (even if, in fact, it has taken place) is not enough to
establish the new. There are many possible options.
Secondly, disagreement with Justice Harlan's statement of the consequences of the play of international legal ideologies can most effectively be reinforced by pointing up the weakness of his assumption that
the lack of agreement he notes is singularly the quality of states' international legal obligations respecting the expropriation of alien property.
6. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
7. Id. at 428-30 (footnotes omitted).
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This is far from being a unique case. In fact, it is sadly reflective of many
areas of international law, none of which is more significant than the law
of the sea.
These contemporary trends are also reflected in the resolutions of
the United Nations General Assembly on permanent sovereignty over
natural resources. Accordingly, a brief adumbration of the trends reflected in these resolutions and an appraisal of their significance as
illustrating both legal and political trends can provide us with insights
as to beliefs in the state of governing international or municipal law, the
possible directions of future legal change, the dilemmas facing capital
exporting countries and the prerogatives upon which many capital importing countries are coming to insist.
III. THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
RESOLUTIONS ON PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER
NATURAL RESOURCES

A.

A Brief History

The benchmark of contemporary declarations on states' rights to
appropriate foreign-owned property is the United Nations General Assembly's Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources. 8 This resolution, after asserting the right of states to nationalize
foreign-owned assets, required that such conduct should be for "reasons
of public utility, security or national interest which are recognized as
overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. "9 The same paragraph then provided that:
In such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation in
accordance with the rules in force in the State taking such measures
in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international
law. 10

The Declaration does not spell out what the rules of international
law are. It may be argued that such silence leaves the definition of the
requisite standards to the states concerned. Such an argument, however, is a denial of any meaningful connotation of the phrase "and in
8. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U .N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. N5217 (1962). For a
contemporary account of this Resolution and the U.N. General Assembly, see Gess,
Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 13 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 398 (1964). Thus,
para. 5 asserts:
The free and beneficial exercise of the sovereignty of peoples and nations over
their natural resources must be furthered by the mutual respect of States based
on their sovereign equality.
See also G.A. Res. 1803, supra para. 7.
9. G.A. Res. 1803, para. 4, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. N5217 (1962).
10. Id. See also id., para. 8.
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accordance with international law" which is independent of the domestic law standards also invoked in paragraph 4; namely, the requirement
that "appropriate compensation" shall be "in accordance with the rules
in force in the state" exercising its power to seize property.
Secondly, the debate, today, is not so much as to what international
law requires, as to whether international law or domestic law standards
should govern the compensation to be paid to expropriated owners.
Contemporary trends, accordingly, would not so much appear to be
disturbing the content of international law as to attacking its relevance.
There would thus appear to be general agreement that the international
standards remain those laid down by the Permanent Court in the
Factory at Chorzow case and reflected in the Norwegian Shipping
Claims arbitration between the United States and Norway where the
tribunal said:
Whether the action of the United States was lawful or not, just
compensation is due to the claimants under the municipal law of the
United States, as well as under international law, based upon the respect for private property.1 1

The debate over whether domestic or international law standards
should be applied has continued. And, in recent years the former position has won increasing adherence in the United Nations General Assembly. Thus, while the 1962 Declaration explicitly invoked, as has been
pointed out, standards of "international law" as governing the payment
of compensation to the victims of expropriation, the most recent statement from that body reverses the previous position. In December 1973
the General Assembly adopted a further Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources 12 which provided, in operative paragraph 3, that the General Assembly:
Affirms that the application of the principle of nationalization
carried out by States, as an expression of their sovereignty in order to
safeguard their natural resources, implies that each State is entitled to
determine the amount of possible compensation and the mode of payment, and that any disputes which might arise should be settled in
accordance with the national legislation of each State carrying out such
measures. 13

Only the United Kingdom voted against this Resolution (although
the United States voted against paragraph 3 in a separate vote) while
11. SCOTT, HAGUE COURT REPORTS, SECOND SERIES 39, at 69 (1932). Although the
United States accompanied its payment of the compensation moneys to Norway with a
protest against this award, it did not disagree with the principle that prompt, adequate
and effective compensation should be paid for private property taken by governments.
12. G.A. Res. 3171, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
13. Id., para. 3.
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sixteen states abstained. The question must be answered asking whether
the trend of General Assembly Resolutions from 1962 to 1973 reflect and
·announce a change in international law, and, themselves, provide the
authority and evidence of that change.
B. Appraisal of the Authority in Public International Law of the Permanent Sovereignty Resolutions

Dr. Rosalyn Higgins 14 and Professors Falk 15 and Onuf1 6 have pioneered the study of the law-creating functions of the political organs
of the United Nations. Dr. Higgins has seen their competence as stemming from their capacity to impose obligations. Professor Falk, on the
other hand, argues that the General Assembly, through consensus, produces norms that operate functionally as legal rules, even though they
are not binding in a formal sense. 17 However, Professor Falk's thesis has
not gone unchallenged, even among those who, in principle, welcome the
recognition of new sources of international law. For example, Professor
Onuf has written:
Obviously, Falk's advocacy is incompatible with his claim to a middle
position in dealing with the question of the legal significance of General
14. See, e.g., R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE
POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS passim (1963); Higgins, The Development of
International Law by the Political Organs of the United Nations, 59 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L
L. 116 (1965).
15. Falk, On the Quasi-Le{?islative Competence of the General Assembly, 60 AM. J.
INT'L L. 782 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Falk, Quasi-Legislative Competence].
16. See Onuf, Professor Falk on the Quasi-Le{?islative Competence of the General
Assembly, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 349 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Onuf].
17. Falk, Quasi-Legislative Competence, supra note 15, at 785. He writes:
[Tlhere is discernible a trend from consent to consensus as the basis of
international legal obligations . This trend reflects an adjustment to the altered
condition of international society, especially the growing perception of social
and economic interdependence, the increased number of states participating in
international affairs, the. growth of international institutions as focal points for
the implementation of the will of the international community and the diminishing willingness to insulate internationally important activity from international legal control by deference to the dogma of domestic jurisdiction . . . . If
international society is to function effectively, it requires a limited legislative
authority, at minimum, to translate an overriding consensus among states into
rules of order and norms of obligation despite the opposition of one or more
sovereign states.
Clearly, limits upon such a potentially wide and subjective set of criteria are called for.
These, Falk indicates as follows:
fT]he limits upon quasi-legislative competence of the Assembly are less a
reflection of the absence of the formal competence to legislate than they are a
consequence of certain political constraints arising from the general requirement
of mobilizing effective community power in support of legislative claims.
Id. at 788.
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Assembly resolutions. His position is in fact a combination of analysis
with a conservative thrust-General Assembly resolutions can be dealt
with in the traditional terms of customary law formation-and advocacy with a radical thrust. The outcome is unsettling, for one feels that
Falk really cannot have it both ways.

In support of this position Onuf argues that:
[l]f Falk were to follow through explicitly on his position that General
Assembly resolutions should be a sui generis source of international
law, then his analysis of the present status of these resolutions in terms
of their functional operation as law undermines the assumption behind
his advocacy that the process of customary law formation is inadequate
to the needs of an interdependent international community possessing
a coherent will of its own. 18

Some of the writers who, like Professor Falk, support the thesis that
the General Assembly enjoys a law-indicating quasi-competence, appear to be generalizing from a limited number of specific instances such
as the prohibition of stationing weapons of mass destruction in outer
space, 19 anticolonialism, 20 and developments in the law of the sea. 21 The
submission here, on the contrary, is that it is premature to attempt to
discover constitutional law creating competences in the General Assembly which are capable of formulation as rules of general validity rather
like those which Professor Onuf sees as Professor Falk's thesis. Rather,
at the present stage, specific topics in which there has been a general
agreement among states, within international agencies, and among publicists, should be examined. The object should be to determine whether
the doctrine or rule has become part of international legal life through
its juristic clarification by scholars, through the political consciousness
of states in that it conforms with their international goals (and with
overriding community goals), and through its institutional viability
from the point of view of international agencies. In this connection,
scholarship may be more fruitfully employed in the discernment and
articulation of emerging rules in the contexts of significant international
interactions than in a search for standards of formal validity. Although,
in the long run, the means of identifying emerging rules as law may
increasingly depend upon consensus in the political organs of the United
Nations as, more and more, legal issues are thrashed out in their committees, assemblies and conferences, and in the organizations they proliferate, the function of legitimation which they may come to perform
needs to go beyond formal ideas of legal validity. The content of a norm
is already becoming of primary importance for the purpose of its acceptance as a rule, just as the content of some customary rules has been the
18.
19.
20.
21.

Onuf, supra note 16, at 352-53.
See G.A. Res. 1884, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 13, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963).
See G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc . A/4684 (1960).
See, e.g., Falk, Quasi-Legislative Competence, supra note 15, at 790-91.
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occasion of their decline and of the contemporary skepticism regarding
the traditional processes for developing customary international law.
In the specific context of the various General Assembly Resolutions
on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources there is a basic point
which can be gleaned from the various authors cited in the foregoing
discussion, and is borne out by that discussion itself. General Assembly
resolutions may emphasize continuing consensus for existing customary norms and may hasten the crystallization of rules which are emerging in the practice of states and of international agencies and organizations and which are coming to be noted in the writings of commentators.
The 1962 Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources illustrates this. On the other hand, General Assembly resolutions do not have the power to amend the law or to legislate legal change.
In this sense then, paragraph 3 of the 1973 Resolution is powerless to
change the legal validity of paragraph 4 of the 1962 Declaration. While
both resolutions may appear to enjoy the same formal status as expressions of the opinions of the General Assembly's membership, they differ
fundamentally in their legal operations. The earlier document testifies
to and reinforces positive international law while the latter is merely an
attempt to obfuscate that testimony.
IV.

THE U.S. DILEMMAS AND THE U.S. STAKE IN AN
UNPREDICTABLE WORLD

Having argued that the present thrust of the Resolutions on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources is, despite paragraph 3 of the
1973 Resolution, to reinforce the traditional international law which
allows states to expropriate foreign-owned assets, but requires the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation, it is necessary
to turn from legal dogmatics to the real world of effective politics. There
we find the traditional and still valid custom more honored in the breach
than the observance.
As the contemporary trends in the international law of the sea
illustrate, when international agreement on the binding effect of specific
rules of law breaks down, each nation promotes its own version of the
applicable rules of international law on the relevant points. The provenance of such versions is inevitably based on the self-interests of each
of the states involved and so is diametrically opposed to premises and
sources of the rules of general international law based on consensus.
Because they are oriented from the standpoint of the specific national
interests of the states advancing them and are not, or are only accidentally, intended to conform to world community interests, they necessarily reflect a retrogressive and degenerative trend towards an order whose
highest values reflect (as Mussolino phrased it) the "sacred egoism" of
states.
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol2/iss2/10

8

Goldie: Some Dilemmas of an Internationalist in a World of State Egoism

306

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 2:299

If the breakdown in consensus has led to the kind of change in
international law which Justice Harlan envisioned in the Sabbatino
case, and which would appear to be reflected around this table, it must
be pointed out that the argument which asserts that now an expropriation without prompt, adequate and effective compensation is not in
breach of international law still requires its independent justification
and underpinning. The very premise of those who argue that the international law on the subject no longer applies is not that the established
body of law has been replaced by a new one permitting such expropriations whose compensation is solely determined by the expropriating
state's domestic rules on the subject, but only that there is an insufficient consensus to underpin the older rules and render them continuingly meaningful in the modern world.
In such a situation there is no new rule of international law. All that
has happened is that an ideological atmosphere has arisen in which each
state considers itself to be entitled to formulate, as many have done with
respect to the breadth of the territorial sea, its own domestic rules supplanting the former international ones. Today, acting on the basis of this
scenario, states have declared that their own views of their rights to
exercise competences in, or to appropriate areas of, the maritime common provide the exclusive standards for their own international conduct. In such a situation the United States, no less than Mexico, Chile,
or Peru, for example, is entitled to formulate its own laws of maritime
jurisdiction and of international investment. In the latter context it
might be prudentially advisable for this country to formulate its laws
and policies so as to protect its own economy from the costs and burdens
of foreign expropriations. The object would be to maximize this country's own immediate benefits when its neighbors do the same. To think
in terms of more long-term or indirect benefits could well render the
American economy unacceptably vulnerable to destructive conduct by
other nations who are motivated to hunt for their most immediate and
obvious advantages. Hence paying the cost now for long-term, contingent, advantages might involve a prudentially inadvisable gamble.
The problem we in the United States are now facing is whether our
policy with respect to foreign expropriations should be oriented from the
standpoint of public international law and world welfare or from that
of individual state welfare. Expropriating states are, clearly, merely
consulting their own perceptions of their immediate individual national
welfare. They are not concerned with the problems their policies create
for capital exporting countries. Nor do they concern themselves with the
impact their expropriations may have on third countries-including
other developing, capital importing countries. These latter may see
other states' expropriations abridge their developmental possibilities.
Hence a general economic retrenchment of economic possibilities could
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result through a contraction of available developmental capital. Such a
contraction would be the inevitable result of the creation of an unfavorable investment atmosphere through investors' apprehension that to invest abroad is to invite the eventual confiscation of that investment.
Such a curtailment could, secondly, also result from the non-availability
of a yield from expropriated foreign investments in say, Nusquamia,
that might otherwise be available to assist the development of Utopia.
There are two different assumptions regarding our own ability to
produce risk capital upon which we could operate. First, we might assume that the supply is inexhaustible and that our economy will not be
affected if the U.S. policy were to accept worldwide expropriations of
American business. Second, we could assume that such wealth is not
inexhaustible and that, therefore, it is necessary to develop protective
policies to prevent a deleterious diminution of necessary risk capital and
foreign exchange-earning income. It is clear from the bills in the House
of Representatives 22 and the Senate 23 which are asserting a U.S. fishery
limit of 200 sea miles that the Congress is seriously considering reversing
traditional policies and values in order to take up what appears to a
number of Congressmen to be a sensible, if unilaterally announced,
economically self-protective posture with respect to ocean resources on
the sensible assumption that these are not inexhaustible.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is with great personal distress that I see the analogy to which I
have been pointing, in these brief remarks, between international investment law and the international law of the sea. In both we tend to
see a breakdown of the rule of law through too much ill-will, vanity,
chauvinism, selfishness and obsessiveness. It is necessary that this emotional climate should change for a calmer and more reasonable one
conditioning the transnational interactions of states. Ideally, what is
needed is a consensus on basic principles of distributive justice according to what each considers to be his due. But less would be enough;
provided that the world's commerce could depend on a greater stability
of expectations and a greater security of transactions, and business
could make a more reasoned appraisal of its expectations.
I am, regretfully, strongly reminded of the opening sentences of
Susan Sontag's essay on Camus' Notebooks. She wrote:
Great writers are either husbands or lovers. Some writers supply
22. H.R. 8665, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (Bill to extend on an Interim Basis the
Jurisdiction of the United States over Certain Ocean Areas and Fisheries in Order to
Protect the Domestic Fishing Industry, and for Other Purposes) .
23. S. 1988, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (Interim Fisheries Zone Extension and Management Bill) .
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the solid virtues of a husband: reliability, intelligibility, generosity,
decency. There are other writers in whom one prizes the gifts of a lover
. .. moodiness, selfishness, unreliability, brutality .

She added, later in the same piece:
Today the house of fiction is full of mad lovers, gleeful rapists,
castrated sons - but very few husbands. The husbands have a bad
conscience, they would all like to be lovers. Even so husbandly and
solid a writer as Thomas Mann was tormented by an ambivalence
toward virtue . . . .24

Can we find parallels between contemporary literature and contemporary politics? Can the dwindling band of states which still provide the
husbandly virtues of reliability, generosity, and respect for the interests
of others be expected to continue in their increasingly thankless roles?
May, paradoxically, these husbandly roles themselves become selfmutilating?25 On the other hand, if all the states of the world were to
24. S. SONTAG, AGAINST INTERPRETATION 52-53 (1969).
25. Do we find an almost Thomas Mann like ambivalence in our own Supreme Court
on "act of state"issues? In a Survey of International Law, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 105 (1973),
I recently commented, at 130-31, on the Supreme Court's decision in First National City
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972), as follows:
[Tlhe figure at the end of this paragraph graphically highlights the impasse in
which the Supreme Court's decision leaves contemporary law and doctrine.
(Ironically, while First National City Bank has the hallmarks of qualifying as
the despair of international lawyers, it could bid for a pre-eminent position in
the calendar of delights of analysts of the Supreme Court's voting patterns and
of teachers of legal process.) That chart is as follows:
Von:s

ISSUES

REHNQUIST
J .;
BURGER C.J.;
WHITE J.

DOUGLAS J.

POWELL J .

BRENNAN J .;
STEWART J.;
MARSHALL J. ;
BLACKMUN J .

TOTALS

( 1) For order reversing Court of
3 Yes
Appeals and remanding case

I Yes

1 Yes

4 No

5 Yes
4 No

(2) National City Bank v. Republic -0{ China should govern

3 Yes

1 Yes

1 No

4 No

(3) Bernstein should govern

3 Yes

1 No

1 No

4 No

5
4
6
3

(4) Act of State doctrine as
enunciated in Sabbatino
should govern

3 No

1 No

1 No

4 Yes

5 No
4 Yes

not mentioned;
but possibly
leaning towards
Yes

I No

I No

4 No

6 No
3 Possible
Yes

(6) Foreign expropriations char3 No
acterized as non -justiciable

1 No

I No

4 Yes

5 No
4 Yes

(7) Separation of powers and
judicial independence invaded
by Court'R opinion

I Yes

I No
(dubitante)

4 Yes

5 Yes
4 No

(5) Sabbatino Amendment
governs
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play the parts of self-centered, obsessive lovers, who will be left to assure
the continuity, stability, and the security of transactions so necessary
to maintain contemporary levels of commercial activity and productivity which, in turn, are essential to the standards and expectations that
are indispensable to the continued and peaceful development of the
modern world?
Can an apologist for this case demonstrate that the Supreme Court has produced any holding (apart from the exercise of its power in issuing the order of
reversal and remand) on the problems which were raised for its judicial solution
in the light of reason and authority? The legal profession would appear to have
been left with more dilemmas than answers.
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